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Abstract
By a well-known result of Kotlarski, Krajewski, and Lachlan (1981), first-order Peano
arithmetic PA can be conservatively extended to the theory CT−[PA] of a truth predicate
satisfying compositional axioms, i.e., axioms stating that the truth predicate is correct on
atomic formulae and commutes with all the propositional connectives and quantifiers. This
results motivates the general question of determining natural axioms concerning the truth
predicate that can be added to CT−[PA] while maintaining conservativity over PA. Our
main result shows that conservativity fails even for the extension of CT−[PA] obtained by
the seemingly weak axiom of disjunctive correctness DC that asserts that the truth predicate
commutes with disjunctions of arbitrary finite size. In particular, CT−[PA] + DC implies
Con(PA).
Our main result states that the theory CT−[PA] + DC coincides with the theory CT0[PA]
obtained by adding ∆0-induction in the language with the truth predicate. This result
strengthens earlier work by Kotlarski (1986) and Cies´lin´ski (2010). For our proof we develop
a new general form of Visser’s theorem on non-existence of infinite descending chains of truth
definitions and prove it by reduction to (Lo¨b’s version of) Go¨del’s second incompleteness
theorem, rather than by using the Visser-Yablo paradox, as in Visser’s original proof (1989).
1. INTRODUCTION
By a theorem of Krajewski, Kotlarski, and Lachlan [12], every countable recursively saturated
model M of PA (Peano Arithmetic) carries a ‘full satisfaction class’, i.e., there is a subset S of
the universe M of M that ‘decides’ the truth/falsity of each sentence of arithmetic in the sense
ofM – even sentences of nonstandard length – while obeying the usual recursive clauses guiding
the behavior of a Tarskian satisfaction predicate. This remarkable theorem implies that theory
Fedor Pakhamov’s research is supported in part by the Young Russian Mathematics award.
2010 Mathematical Subject Classification: 03F30.
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CT−[PA] (compositional truth over PA with induction only for the language LA of arithmetic) is
conservative over PA, i.e., if an LA-sentence ϕ is provable in CT
−[PA], then ϕ is already provable
in PA. New proofs of this conservativity result were given by Visser and Enayat [6] using basic
model theoretic ideas, and by Leigh [14] using proof theoretic tools; these new proofs make it
clear that in the Krajewski-Kotlarski-Lachlan theorem the theory PA can be replaced by any
‘base’ theory that supports a modicum of coding machinery for handling elementary syntax.
On the other hand, it is well-known [9, Thm. 8.39 and Cor. 8.40] that the consistency of
PA (and much more) is readily provable in the stronger theory CT[PA], which is the result of
strengthening CT−[PA] with the scheme of induction over natural numbers for all LA+T-formulae,
where LA+T := LA ∪ {T(x)}.
1 Indeed, it is straightforward to demonstrate the consistency of
PA within the subsystem CT1[PA] of CT[PA], where CTn[PA] is the subtheory of CT[PA] with
the scheme of induction over natural numbers limited to LA+T-formulae that are at most of
complexity Σn [16, Thm. 2.8].
The discussion above leaves open whether CT0[PA] is conservative over PA. Kotlarski [11] es-
tablished that CT0[PA] is a subtheory of CT
−[PA] + Ref(PA), where Ref(PA) is the LA+T-sentence
stating that “every first order consequence of PA is true”. Recently  Le lyk [15] demonstrated
that the converse also holds, which immediately implies that CT0[PA] is not conservative over
PA since Con(PA) is readily provable in CT−[PA] + Ref(PA).2 Kotlarski’s aforementioned theo-
rem was refined by Cies´lin´ski [3] who proved that CT−[PA]+ “T is closed under propositional
proofs” and CT−[PA] + Ref(PA) axiomatize the same theory. The main result of this paper, in
turn, refines Cies´lin´ski’s result by demonstrating:
1. Theorem. CT−[I∆0 + Exp] +DC and CT0[PA] axiomatize the same first order theory.
In the above theorem, CT−[I∆0 + Exp] is the weakening of CT
−[PA] obtained by replacing the
‘base theory’ PA with its fragment consisting of Robinson’s arithmetic Q, along with the scheme
for ∆0-induction and the totality of the exponential function; and DC (disjunctive correctness)
is the statement asserting that a disjunction of arithmetical sentences of arbitrary finite length
is true (in the sense of T) iff one of the disjuncts is true. Coupled with  Le lyk’s aforementioned
result [15], Theorem 1 shows that CT−[I∆0 + Exp] + DC, CT
−[PA] + DC, and CT0[PA] + Ref(PA)
are axiomatizations of the same theory.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we review preliminary definitions and results,
including more precise versions of those definitions and results mentioned in this introduction. In
Section 3 we establish the veracity of the principle IC (Inductive Correctness, often referred to in
the literature as “internal induction”) within CT−[I∆0 + Exp] + DC. This is demonstrated by first
establishing a new general form of Visser’s theorem [19] on nonexistence of infinite descending
chains of truth definitions with the help of (Lo¨b’s version of) Go¨del’s second incompleteness
theorem instead of the Visser-Yablo paradox. In Section 4 we show that CT0[PA] is a subtheory
of CT−[PA] + DC+ IC; thus Sections 3 and 4 together constitute the proof of the hard direction
1CT[PA] dwarfs PA in arithmetical strength: By a classical theorem (discovered by a number of researchers,
including Feferman and Takeuti, and explained in [9]) the arithmetical consequences of CT[PA] are the same as the
arithmetical consequences of ACA, the subsystem of second order arithmetic obtained by adding the full scheme of
induction over natural numbers (in the language of second order arithmetic) to the well-known subsystem ACA0
of second order arithmetic.
2This result was first claimed by Kotlarski [11], but his proof outline of Ref(PA) within CT0[PA] was found to
contain a serious gap in 2011 by Heck and Visser; this gap cast doubt over the veracity of Kotlarski’s claim until
the issue was resolved by  Le lyk in his doctoral dissertation [15]. Mention should also be made of the  Le lyk-Wcis lo
paper [16] which gives an elegant proof of the non conservativity of CT0[PA] over PA.
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of Theorem 1 since it is routine to verify that both DC and IC are theorems of CT0[PA]. We
close the paper with some open problems in Section 5.
Historical Note. The concept of disjunctive correctness first appeared in the work of Kra-
jewski [13, p.133], who called it “∨-completeness”; the current terminology was coined in a
working paper of Enayat and Visser that was privately circulated in 2011, only a fragment [6] of
which has been published so far. The working paper included the claim that CT−[PA] + DC is
conservative over PA, but the proof outline presented in the paper was found in 2013 to contain
a significant gap by Cies´lin´ski and his (then) doctoral students  Le lyk and Wcis lo. On the other
hand, in 2012 Enayat found a proof of CT0[PA] within CT
−[I∆0 + Exp] + DC+ IC; his proof was
only privately circulated, and later was presented in the doctoral dissertation of  Le lyk [15]. This
proof forms the content of Section 4 of this paper. In light of these developments, and the well-
known conservativity of CT−[PA] + IC over PA (see Theorem 2.3), the question of conservativity
of CT−[PA] + DC over PA came to prominence amongst truth theory experts [5, p.226], and has
been unsuccessfully attacked by a number of researchers since 2013, until Pakhomov established
IC within CT−[I∆0 + Exp] +DC as in Section 3 of this paper, which, coupled with Enayat’s
aforementioned result, yields Theorem 1 and exhibits the unexpected arithmetical strength of
DC.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Definition.
(a) LA is the usual language of first order arithmetic {+, ·,S(x), <, 0}. To simplify matters,
we will assume that the logical constants of first order logic consist only of ¬ (negation),∨
(disjunction), and ∃ (existential quantification); in particular ∀ (universal quantification) as well
as ∧ (conjunction) and other propositional connectives are treated here as derived notions.
(b) Given a language L ⊇ LA, an L-formula ϕ is said to be a ∆0(L)-formula if all the quantifiers
of ϕ are bounded by L-terms, i.e., they are of the form ∃x ≤ t, or of the form ∀x ≤ t, where t
is a term of L not involving x. Given a predicate U(x), LA+U is the language LA ∪ {U(x)}.
(c) Given a language L ⊇ LA, I∆0(L) is the scheme of induction over natural numbers for ∆0(L)-
formulae. We shall omit the reference to L if L = LA, e.g., a ∆0-formula is a ∆0(LA)-formula;
and we shall use I∆0(U) to abbreviate I∆0(LA+U).
(d) I∆0 + Exp is the fragment of Peano arithmetic obtained by strengthening Robinson’s arith-
metic Q with I∆0 and with the sentence Exp that expresses the totality of the exponential
function y = 2x. It is well-known that Exp can be written as ∀x∃yExp(x, y), where Exp(x, y) is
a ∆0-predicate which, provably in I∆0, satisfies the familiar algebraic laws governing the graph
of the exponential function, cf. [8, Sec. V3(c)].
(e) SentA(x) is the LA-formula that expresses “x is the Go¨del-number of a formula of LA with
no free variables”, and FormnA(x) is the LA-formula that expresses “x is the Go¨del-number of
a formula of LA with precisely n free variables”. We use SentA and Form
n
A to refer to the
corresponding definable classes of Go¨del-numbers of LA-formulae.
(f) Given a (base) theory B whose language is LA and which extends I∆0 + Exp, CT
−[B] is the
theory obtained by strengthening B by adding the sentences tarski0 through tarski4 described
below, where we use the following conventions: τ1 and τ2 vary over Go¨del-numbers of closed
3
LA-terms, τ
◦
i is the value of the term coded by τi, ϕ and ψ range over Go¨del-numbers of LA-
sentences, v ranges over variables, γ(v) ranges over Form1A, and x is the numeral representing
the value of x.
tarski0 := ∀x (T(x)→ SentA(x)) .
tarski1 := ∀τ1, τ1 (T(τ1 = τ2)↔ τ
◦
1 = τ
◦
2 ) .
tarski2 := ∀ϕ((T(¬ϕ)↔ ¬T(ϕ)) .
tarski3 := ∀ϕ,ψ T(ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ (T(ϕ) ∨ T(ψ)) .
tarski4 := ∀v ∀γ(v) (T (∃v γ(v))↔ ∃x T(γ(x)).
(g) CT0[B] := CT
−[B] ∪ I∆0(T).
(h) DC (disjunctive correctness) is the LA+T-sentence asserting that T commutes with disjunc-
tions of arbitrary length, i.e., DC asserts that for all numbers s and for all sequences 〈ϕi : i < s〉
from SentA, the following equivalence holds:
T(
∨
i<s
ϕi)↔ ∃i < s T(ϕi),
where for definiteness
∨
i<s
ϕi is defined
3 by recursion:
∨
i<0
ϕi := ϕ0 and
∨
i<t+1
ϕi :=
(∨
i<t
ϕi
)
∨ ϕt.
(i) We will employ the abbreviation
∧
i<s
ϕi for ¬
∨
i<s
¬ϕi, and CC (conjunctive correctness) for
the LA+T-sentence
T(
∧
i<s
ϕi)↔ ∀i < s T(ϕi).
• Note that the commutativity of T with negation implies that DC and CC are equivalent.
(j) IC (inductive correctness4) is the LA+T-sentence asserting that each LA-instance of induction
over natural numbers is true, i.e., IC asserts that for all unary LA -formulae ψ = ψ(x), T(pIndψq)
holds, where Indψ is the following LA-sentence that asserts that ψ is inductive:
ψ(0)→ (∀x (ψ(x)→ ψ(x+ 1))→ ∀x ψ(x)) .
The B = PA case of Theorem 2.2 below, and its elaboration Theorem 2.3, were first estab-
lished in the work of Krajewski, Kotlarski, and Lachlan [12] for B = PA, where PA is formulated
in a relational language, and ‘domain constants’ play the role of numerals. As mentioned in
the introduction to this paper, their result was couched in model theoretic terms involving the
notions of recursive saturation and satisfaction classes, but it is well-known that their formu-
lation is equivalent to appropriately formulated conservatity assertions (the key ingredients of
this equivalence are the following facts: Every consistent theory in a countable language has a
recursively saturated model, and countable recursively saturated models are resplendent). Later
Kaye [10] developed the theory of satisfaction classes over models of PA in languages incorpo-
rating function symbols; his work was extended by Engstro¨m [7] to truth classes over models
3One can also formulate disjunctive correctness in a stronger way by asserting that all disjunctions (and not
just the ones that are grouped to the left) are well-behaved with respect to T. But the current frugal form, as
shown by Theorem 1, ends up implying the seemingly stronger form since it is easy to show in CT0 that the two
forms are equivalent.
4This condition has been referred to as Int (internal induction) in the literature.
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of PA in functional languages.5 More recently, newer and more informative proofs of Theorems
2.2 and 2.3 have been found in the joint work of Visser and Enayat [6] (with base theories that
support a modicum of coding, and which are formulated in a relational language), and by Leigh
[14] (for functional base theories that support a modicum of coding). As verified by Cies´lin´ski [5,
Ch. 7], the Visser-Enayat model theoretic methodology can be extended so as to accommodate
functional languages.
2.2. Theorem. CT−[B] is conservative over B for every arithmetical base theory B extending
I∆0 + Exp.
2.3. Theorem. CT−[PA] + IC is conservative over PA.
The direction (a)⇒ (b) of Theorem 2.4 below is due to Kotlarski [11]; the other direction is
due to  Le lyk [15].
2.4. Theorem. (Kotlarski- Le lyk) The following theories are deductively equivalent :
(a) CT−[PA]+ Ref(PA).
(b) CT0[PA].
The direction (a)⇒ (b) of Theorem 2.5 below is due to Cies´lin´ski [3], who refined Kotlarski’s
proof of the direction (a)⇒ (b) of Theorem 2.4; the other direction involves a routine induction.
2.5. Theorem. (Cies´lin´ski) The following theories are deductively equivalent :
(a) CT−[PA] + “T is closed under propositional proofs”.
(b) CT0[PA].
3. DISJUNCTIVE CORRECTNESS IMPLIES INDUCTIVE CORRECTNESS
3.1. Definition. ITB (iterated truth biconditionals) is a theory formulated in two-sorted first
order logic. The first sort x, y, z . . . of ITB is for the ‘natural numbers’. The second sort α, β, γ, . . .
is for the indices of truth definition. The language LITB of ITB is obtained by augmenting the
language LA of arithmetic with two binary predicates: α ≺ β and T(α, x), but we shall write
T(α, x) as Tα(x) to display the indexicality of α. The axioms of ITB come in three groups. The
first group consists of the axioms of Q (Robinson arithmetic); the second group stipulates that
≺ is a strict partial order; and the third group consists of the following biconditionals Bϕ:
Bϕ := ∀α(Tα(pϕq)↔ ϕ
≺α),
where ϕ ranges over all LITB-sentences, and for each index variable α, ϕ
≺α denotes the rela-
tivization of ϕ to the cone of indices below α, i.e. the formula obtained by replacing all the
quantifiers of the form ∀β (∃β) with ∀β ≺ α (∃β ≺ α), and if there is a bounded instance of α
we make the appropriate renaming. Clearly ϕ≺α = ϕ if ϕ is a purely arithmetical formula.
• Note that we take the theory ITB over the variant of many-sorted logic that allows domains
of some sorts to be empty.
5The subtle distinction between satisfaction classes and truth classes, and their close relationship, is explained
in [6] and [5, Ch. 7].
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• We will use the following convention to lighten the notation: The notation pϕq for the
Go¨del number of a formula ϕ will be generally used, but the corner-notation will be omitted
when ϕ appears inside of a truth predicate T, or inside an indexed version of T.
The proof of the following theorem was inspired by the recent James Walsh proof [18] of
nonexistence of infinite recursive provably descending chains of sentences with respect to <Con-
order.
3.2. Theorem. ITB + ∃α(α = α) proves the existence of a ≺-minimal element. Equivalently,
the following theory DTB (descending truth biconditionals) is inconsistent:
DTB := ITB+ ∀α∃β(β ≺ α) + ∃α(α = α).
Proof. Consider the formula θ(x):
θ(x) := ∀α(Tα(x)).
We will verify that θ(x) satisfies the following Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions in
DTB; in what follows ϕ and ψ range over all sentences of the language of DTB:
HBL-1. DTB ⊢ ϕ =⇒ DTB ⊢ θ(pϕq).
HBL-2. DTB ⊢ θ(pϕ→ ψq)→ (θ(pϕq)→ θ(pψq)).
HBL-3. DTB ⊢ θ(pϕq)→ θ(pθ(pϕq)q).
It is easy to see that for every axiom A of DTB we have DTB ⊢ A≺α. The assumption embodied
in DTB that the set of indices is nonempty and has no minimal element is invoked only at this
step of the proof, in verifying that DTB ⊢ A≺α for
A : = ∀γ∃β(β ≺ γ) ∧ ∃γ(γ = γ).
Routine considerations show that HBL-1 holds based on an easy induction on the number of
steps of the proof of ϕ within DTB.
For a given ϕ and ψ, HBL-2 follows directly from the biconditional axioms Bϕ→ψ, Bϕ, and Bψ
of ITB.
Finally, HBL-3 holds since:
ITB ⊢ θ(pθ(pϕq)q)←→ (∀α∀β((β ≺ α)→ Tβ(ϕ))).
On the other hand, the formula ¬θ(p0 = 1q) is provable in ITB, and therefore in DTB. So by
Lo¨b’s version6 of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, DTB is inconsistent. 
3.3. Lemma. CT−[I∆0 + Exp] + DC proves IC.
6Lo¨b’s paper [17], in which the venerable ‘Lo¨b’s Theorem’ was proved, is responsible for the now common
standard textbook framework for the presentation of ‘abstract’ form of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem:
If T is a theory extending Q that supports a unary predicate θ(x) satisfiying condition HBL-1, HBL2, and HBL-3,
and γ is a T -provable fixed point of ¬θ (i.e., the equivalence of γ and ¬θ(pγq) is provable in T ), then either
¬∃x θ(x) is not provable in T , or T is inconsistent. See, e.g., [1, Ch. 18], for the presentation of such a general
form of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem.
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Proof. By Theorem 3.2 we can fix an inconsistent finite subtheory DTB− of DTB. Suppose
DTB− contains only biconditionals for the formulae ϕ0, . . . , ϕk−1. We will use ITB
− to denote
the subtheory of ITB whose only biconditional axioms are {Bϕi : i < k} .
For the rest of the proof we will reason in CT−[I∆0 + Exp] + DC. In order to prove IC we
assume for a contradiction that some arithmetical ψ(x) is not inductive in the sense of T, i.e.,
we have:
¬T (ψ(0)→ (∀x (ψ(x)→ ψ(x+ 1))→ ∀x ψ(x))).
By induction on natural numbers n we define interpretations ιn of ITB
−. Note that each inter-
pretation is just a finite sequence of formulae and thus could be easily represented in arithmetic.
The interpretation of arithmetic in each ιn is the identity interpretation, but the domain of
indices of truth definition ιn is given by the formula D
(n)(x):
x < n ∧ ¬ψ(x).
For all n the relation ≺ is interpreted by <. The formula Tα(x) is interpreted by the formula
IT(n)(y, x), where y corresponds to α, and x corresponds to itself:∧
i<k
(x = pϕiq→
∧
m<n
((y = m ∧ ¬ψ(m))→ ιm(ϕi))),
where ιm(ϕi) is the ιm-translation of the sentence ϕi. It is easy to see that this definition could
be carried out in I∆0 + Exp.
Let us now prove that the translations given by ιn are indeed the desired interpretations
inside T, i.e., we need to prove that for all n and axioms A of ITB− we have T(ιn(A)). Clearly it
is the case for all the axioms of Q and the axioms of partial order for ≺. Now let us show that
for any s < k :
(N) T(ιn(∀α(Tα(ϕs)↔ ϕ
≺α
s ))).
By compositional axioms, we just need to show that for all u such that u < n and T(¬ψ(u))
we have:
T
(∧
i<k
(
ϕs = ϕi →
∧
m<n
((u = m ∧ ¬ψ(m))→ ιm(ϕi))
))
↔ T
(
ιn
(
ϕ≺us
))
.
Now by compositional axioms and DC (in the form of CC, as explained in part (i) of Definition
2.1) our task can be reduced to proving the equivalence:
T (ιu (ϕs))↔ T
(
ιn
(
ϕ≺us
))
.
In order to prove this we will show by induction on subformulae θ of ϕs that for the universal
closure θ of θ:
T
(
ιu(θ
)
↔ T
(
ιn(θ
≺u
)
)
.
Note that since ϕs is a fixed formula with finitely many subformulae, actually this external
induction will be formalizable in CT−[I∆0+Exp]+DC despite the fact that it lacks the induction
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axiom for the appropriate class of formulae. The only non-trivial case here is the case when θ is
Tα(x):
T (ιu (∀α∀xTα(x)))↔ T(ιn(∀α ≺ u ∀x(Tα(x)))).
Hence we just need to show that for all p < u such that T(¬ψ(p)), and for all o, the following pair
of formulae (whose only formal difference is in the bound for indices of the second conjunction)
are equivalent:
T
(∧
i<k
(
o = ϕi →
∧
m<u
((
p = m ∧ ¬ψ(m)
)
→ ιm(ϕi)
)))
,
T
(∧
i<k
(
o = ϕi →
∧
m<n
((
p = m ∧ ¬ψ(m)
)
→ ιm(ϕi)
)))
.
But since p < u < n, we trivially use DC (in the form of CC) to show that the formulae are
indeed equivalent. Thus we conclude that (N) holds.
Choose some n such that T(¬ψ(n)); this is possible since we assumed that induction fails
for ψ(x) in the sense of T. It is easy to see that ιn actually is an interpretation of DTB
− inside
T. Now we could follow the proof of inconsistency of DTB− inside T to derive a contradiction,
thereby completing the proof of IC. 
3.4. Corollary. CT−[I∆0 + Exp] + DC proves PA, and therefore CT
−[I∆0 + Exp] + DC and
CT−[PA] + DC axiomatize the same theory.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.3, and the provability of Tarski bi-
conditionals in CT−[I∆0 + Exp]. 
4. DISJUNCTIVE CORRECTNESS + INDUCTIVE CORRECTNESS IMPLIES
∆0(T)-INDUCTION
In this section we shall prove that I∆0(T) is provable in CT
−[PA] +DC+ IC, which, coupled
with Lemma 3.3 completes the proof of the nontrivial direction of Theorem 1. We begin with a
key definition:
4.1. Definition. In what follows ∈Ack is “Ackermann’s epsilon”, i.e., x ∈Ack y is the arithmetical
formula that expresses “the x-th bit of the binary expansion of y is a 1”.
(a) For a unary predicate U(x), the LA+U sentence PC(U) (read as “U is piece-wise coded”) is
the following sentence:
∀u ∃y ∀x [(U(x) ∧ x < u)↔ x ∈Ack y] .
(b)Given an n-ary formula LA+U-formula ϕ(U, x0, ..., xn−1), PCϕ is the following LA+U-sentence:
∀u ∃y ∀x0, ...∀xn−1 [(ϕ(U, x0, ..., xn−1) ∧ ~x < u)↔ ~x ∈Ack y] ,
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where ~x = 〈xi : i < n〉 is a canonical code for the ordered n-tuple (x0, ..., xn−1).
The following lemma shows that over I∆0 + Exp the scheme I∆0(U) is equivalent to the
single sentence ‘U is piecewise coded’. The lemma is folklore; we present the proof for the sake
of completeness.
4.2. Lemma. The following are equivalent over I∆0 + Exp:
(a) I∆0(U).
(b) PC(U).
Proof. We will reason in I∆0 + Exp. Recall that ∈Ack has a ∆0-definition within I∆0 [8].
(a −→ b): Assume I∆0(U). Given u, let w be the Ackermann-code for the set of predecessors of
u. Clearly w =
∑
i<u
2i = 2u − 1, and w is an upper bound for any w′ that codes a subset of the
predecessors of u. Consider the ∆0-formula:
δ(u) := ∃y < w + 1 ∀x < u [(U(x) ∧ x < u)↔ x ∈Ack y] .
A simple induction using I∆0(U) shows that ∀u δ(u) holds.
(b → a): A straightforward induction on the complexity of ∆0(U)-formulae shows that if U
is piecewise coded and δ(U, x0, ..., xn−1) is a ∆0(U)-formula, then PCδ holds. We could then
trivially deduce the least number principle for ∆0(U)-formula, which is of course equivalent to
I∆0(U). 
• In the next lemma and its proof, Code(c, ϕ, u) denotes the ternary LA+T-formula
∀x < u (T (ϕ(x))↔ x ∈Ack c) , and PC(ϕ) denotes the LA+T-formula ∀u ∃c Code(c, ϕ, u).
4.3. Lemma. CT−[I∆0 + Exp] + IC proves ∀ϕ(Form
1
A(ϕ)→ PC(ϕ)).
Proof. We reason in CT−[I∆0 + Exp] + IC. Given ϕ(x) in Form
1
A, we need to show:
(1) ∀u ∃c Code(c, ϕ, u).
By the compositional properties of T, (1) is equivalent to:
(2) T(∀u ψ(u)), where ψ(u) := ∃c(∀x < u ϕ(x)↔ x ∈Ack c).
On the other hand, ∀u ψ(u) is the conclusion of the formula Indψ (asserting the inductive
property of ψ) given by IC. So (2) follows directly from IC and the easily verified facts T(ψ(0))
and T(∀u (ψ(u)→ ψ(u+ 1))). 
4.3.1. Remark. Lemma 4.3 can be readily strengthened to a more general result whose proof
we leave to the reader: the ω-interpretation that can be informally described by the motto
“sets are T-extensions of unary arithmetical formulae” satisfies ACA0, provably in CT
−[PA]+ IC.
Indeed, it is a theorem of CT−[PA] that IC is equivalent to the veracity of ACA0 within this
interpretation.
4.4. Lemma. CT−[I∆0 + Exp] + DC+ IC ⊢ I∆0(T).
Proof. Reason in CT−[I∆0 + Exp] + DC+ IC. By Lemma 4.2, it suffices to show that T is
piecewise coded. Let 〈ϕi : i < u〉 be the sequence of arithmetical sentences such that ϕi is the
sentence with Go¨del-number i if there is such a sentence, and otherwise ϕi is the sentence 0 = 1.
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We wish to show that {i < u : T(ϕi)} is coded. Towards this goal, consider the unary formula
θ(x) ∈ FormA given by:
θ(x) :=
∨
i<u
((x = i) ∧ ϕi) .
Claim (∗) ∀i < u [T(ϕi)↔ T(θ(i))] .
(→) Suppose T(ϕi) for some i < u. Then T ((i = i) ∧ ϕi) , and hence by DC we haveT(θ(i)).
(←) Suppose T(θ(i)) for some i < u. Then by DC, there is some j < u such that T
(
(i = j) ∧ ϕj
)
.
So T(ϕi) holds since T commutes with conjunction and T(i = j) holds iff i = j.
By coupling Claim (∗) together with Lemma 4.3, we can conclude that {i < u : T (θ(i))} is coded.

5. CLOSING REMARKS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
5.1. Question. Is the generalization of Theorem 1 in which CT− is weakened to CS− (where S
stands for satisfaction) true?
• The notion CS−[B] is defined in [6] for base theories B formulated in relational languages,
using the notation BFS (FS for “full satisfaction”); and in [5, Ch. 7] for functional languages.
We expect that an examination of the proofs in Sections 3 and 4 would show that this
question has a positive answer.
5.2. Question. Is IC provable in CT−[S12] + DC?
• In the above, S12 is Buss’s well-known arithmetical theory whose provable recursive func-
tions are precisely the functions computable in polynomial time, as in [2]. For the above
question to make sense, part (f) of Definition 1.1 should be adjusted so as to accommodate
the fact that the language of S12 extends LA. In the proof of Lemma 3.3, most likely it
is possible to use some tricks with effective formulae in order to modify the definition of
ιn in such a way that their sizes will be polynomial. But in order for the construction
to work we will also need to ensure that DC is still enough to show that ιn are indeed
interpretations inside the truth predicate.
5.3. Question. Is there a fixed-point free proof of Lemma 3.3?
• The proof of Lemma 3.3 is based on Theorem 3.2, whose proof implicitly relies (in the
very last step) on the existence of a fixed point for the formula ¬θ(x).
5.4. Question. Is CT−[PA]+ “T contains all arithmetical instances of propositional tautologies”
conservative over PA?
• Cies´lin´ksi ([4], [5, Ch. 12]) has shown that CT−[PA]+ “T contains all arithmetical instances
of theorems of first order logic” is deductively equivalent to CT−[PA] + Ref(PA), and
therefore by Theorem 2.4, it is yet another axiomatization of CT0[PA].
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